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In September 2021, MEPs voted in favour of a new EU Ethics body to oversee
movements of personnel between the public and the private sector and proposed
an interinstitutional agreement to this end. Replacing the current Independent
Ethical Committee, the new body would be responsible for proposing and advising
Commissioners, MEPs and staff of the institutions on ethics rules. The new Ethics
Body, however, is not the regulatory unicorn many are hoping for. The gaps and
ineffectiveness of EU policies to address revolving door moves stem from a limited
understanding of the issue, which in turn is a result of lack of research and interest.
The EU cannot devise better policies unless more is known about the phenomenon.
Tackling the revolving doors in the EU
As a term, the revolving door refers to movements between the public and the
private sector. At the European level, a professional from the public sector moves to
the private sector for various reasons:
• For a politician, the end of a mandate may lead to a recruitment by a private
sector company.
• For an official, a new recruitment may take place because of retirement,
resignation or a leave on personal grounds.
• For a temporary agent (hired on a contractual basis for a limited time), the end
of a contract may lead to looking for jobs in the private sector.
But the revolving door also encompasses movements from the private to the public
sector. Here again, these movements can happen for various reasons: a nomination
to a political position, success at the European Personnel Selection Office (EPSO)
competition, recruitment as a temporary agent, or returning to the EU administration
after a leave on personal grounds.
The revolving door is not a new phenomenon. However, we suggest that certain
trends in EU administration – the managerialisation of human resources, long-
term contractual positions, the increased proximity to the regulated parties, and a
possibility to be on leave on personal grounds for up to 12 years – have intensified
the swinging of governmental turnstiles.
In the last few years, the European Ombudsman Emily O’Reilly, in charge of
promoting good administration in the EU, has made repeated calls for a better
regulation of the revolving door phenomenon. In February 2021, she launched an
inquiry into the management of revolving door moves in the European Commission.
On 19 October 2021, she sent a letter to the President of the Commission,
Ursula von der Leyen, requesting a meeting, mentioning in particular the case
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of Directorate-General (DG) for Competition Policy where there have been ‘very
significant and high-profile cases [of the revolving door] in recent years’.
The EU has not sat idle to watch ‘revolvers’ go through the door. A host of policy
measures aiming to regulate these movements have been adopted at the European
level. These measures include general transparency policies, conflict of interest
rules, and the creation of an Independent Ethical Committee. The resulting
patchwork of regulation does not convince. Below we focus specifically on the
Independent Ethical Committee. By elaborating on its mandate and activities, we
show what it is that afflicts the EU’s efforts to regulate revolving door moves and why
the new Ethics Body is not the perfect fix.
The Independent Ethical Committee
To avoid conflicts of interest in the case of revolving door moves, the Commission
established, in 2003, the Ad Hoc Ethical Committee. The role of the three-member
committee is to advise the Commission on whether the planned professional
activities of Commissioners after leaving office are compatible with the Treaties.
Appointment as a member requires independence, an impeccable record of
professional behaviour, and sound knowledge of the legal framework and working
methods of the Commission.
In 2013, only after a decade, the Committee was mired in controversy. Michel
Petite, a former adviser of three Commission Presidents, resigned from his position
as chairperson of the Ethical Committee after a campaign led by transparency
NGOs. Petite headed the Commission’s Legal Services until 2008 after which he
moved to Clifford Chance. At Clifford Chance, he specialises in competition law and
advises several clients, including a tobacco company. These client-related activities
were soon seen as a source of a potential conflict of interest, which led to Petite’s
resignation and renaming the Committee as the Independent Ethical Committee. It is
currently headed by a former ECJ justice, Allan Rosas.
This misstep aside, the Committee is little-known or understood by those not inside
the EU bubble. This invisibility is associated with its limited ability to ensure that no
conflicts of interest occur in revolving door moves. First, while the Commission must
consider the Committee’s opinions to approve the new occupations, formally these
opinions are only advisory, and the Commission can depart from them.
The second aspect that weakens the Committee’s impact is that the scrutiny
period is limited to two years. According to Article 11 of the Code of Conduct,
ex-Commissioners shall inform the Commission of their intention to engage in a
professional activity during a period of two years after they have ceased to hold
office. Controversies that surround post-employment activities of former Competition
Commissioners Neelie Kroes, Karel van Miert and Mario Monti suggest that the
scrutiny period may be too short, which is then reflected as an institutional weakness
on the part of the Committee.
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But perhaps most critically for the powers of the Committee, and the issue that has
received little attention so far, is that the Committee is only competent for people
who have had a mandate as Commissioner. Academic research on revolving doors
as well as NGOs initiatives, such as RevolvingDoor Watch, are similarly focusing
mainly on Commissioners or Directors-General and other high-ranking officials.
However, masses of lower officials move from the public to the private sector and
back again, and this lower-level mobility mostly remains outside the regulatory radar
and public attention.
Lower-level mobility in action: the case of EU
competition policy
Data on lower-level mobility is difficult to gather but a study conducted in 2016-2019
by Lola Avril shows that 17 percent of competition lawyers in Brussels law firms have
served in EU institutions as permanent or contract staff. The majority (68 percent)
of these former officials or temporary agents have held the rank of administrator
or contractor in the EU institutions (grades 5 to 12 of the Staff regulations). They
were, for example, case handlers at DG Competition, in charge of implementing EU
policies, analysing cases, drafting Commission decisions or preparing negotiations
with companies. This inside experience is incredibly valuable to law firms recruiting
ex-officials.
The door revolves quickly at the European Commission. Although some senior
officials leave public service at the end of their careers, the majority switch to the
private sector much earlier, only a few years after entry: 75 percent of the revolvers
stay in a public institution less than five years. This is explained by the intensified
use of temporary contractual positions in EU administration, and even more in DG
Competition, where temporary agents now represent 21 percent (179 agents out
of 849), a much higher proportion than the EU average (5.7 percent) according to
European Commission data.
This lower-level mobility falls only partly within the scope of EU policies. Article 16
of the Staff Regulations establishes a control of the appointing authority over new
activities of former officials. The Commission has the power to ‘forbid’ the official
from accepting a new employment or ‘give its approval subject to any conditions it
thinks fit’. Furthermore, former officials should not engage in lobbying or advocacy
vis-à-vis their former institution. In this latter respect, Article 16(3) is written in a
conflicting manner. It says that the Commission ‘shall, in principle, prohibit’, with the
terms ‘shall’ and ‘in principle’ cancelling each other out. In addition, this prohibition
only applies to senior positions and is applicable to a period of 12 months after
leaving service.
Looking at the report of the Commission’s decisions for 2019, we see other gaps in
the implementation of the Article 16 control. First, the Commission only publishes
decisions for activities which could potentially give rise to lobbying or advocacy
work without explaining the criteria used to define this condition. Out of 50 activities
declared by departing officials, only four decisions were published for 2019. Second,
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the Commission does not seem to exercise the powers vested in it to slow down or
stop altogether the turning of the revolving door. In all four published decisions, it
imposed some conditions on the former officials but approved the new occupation.
Law firms as a grey area
The final point which is particularly problematic regarding both former
Commissioners and officials and temporary agents from DG Competition is
their recruitment by law firms. The crucial role of law firms in the revolving door
movements in France has recently been documented by France and Vauchez.
In the EU, our preliminary analysis of the opinions of the Committee shows that it
has voiced particular concerns about ex-Commissioners’ moves to law firms. The
Committee highlights that being employed as a lawyer seems to open up possibilities
to lobby the Commission while appearing not to be doing so and merely acting
as a lawyer. In its opinion dated 18 December 2020, the Committee evaluated
Commissioner Oettinger’s occupational status as a lawyer in the following way
(paras. 30 and 31):
…the Committee considers that offering, and performing such [lobbying
and interest representation] activities towards the Commission via an
activity as lawyer would not be compatible with the principle of integrity
established by Article 245 TFEU and the need to preserve public trust in the
Commission. Members of the Commission are well-known personalities and
public persons associated with a wide range of EU policies and issues. The
Committee considers therefore that former Commissioner Oettinger and
any other former Member of the Commission who intends to offer services
as a lawyer should not offer lobbying services or interest representation
towards the Commission on any matter for a period of two years after
ceasing to hold office.
This ambiguity about lawyers’ activities is also reinforced by Article 4 of the
Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register which excludes
from its scope the provision of legal advice in certain situations. While the distinction
between legal advice and lobbying may be clear at the level of rules, in practice the
boundary is blurred. This makes the attractiveness of law firms as a destination for
departing officials even more worrisome. We suspect that there are reasons to be
concerned about the importance of law firms in facilitating mobility flows between the
public and private sectors in relation to both former Commissioners and lower-level
officials, but in the absence of solid data, we are poking around in the dark.
The future
As much as we would welcome the new Ethics Body, we remain cautious as to its
redeeming impact. The new body will not resolve the fundamental question of what
the optimal relationship between government and the private sector is allowing for
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the infusion of expertise while at the same time minimising the risk of inappropriate
conduct.
We need both academic research and public discussion based on the findings of
the research. The current research on revolving door movements relies heavily
on the work of the Corporate European Observatory, ALTER-EU and other ’cause
entrepreneurs’. Although their input is valuable, academic research is also needed to
systematically chart and analyse the phenomenon.
A renewed research interest in this area would help identify gaps and grey zones
in EU policies and assist in grasping the institutional and professional logics behind
revolving doors. It would also provide insights into the type of knowledge valued in
the European regulatory space (within and outside EU institutions) and allow us to
reflect on the evolution of the public/private border in this space.
And while there is a lot of work to do on the EU, an equally daunting amount of work
awaits at the Member State level. Member States have their own ‘exes’ to manage.
What is worrying and further emphasises the importance of the research is that in
many Member States, the pressing rule of law problems intertwine with the revolving
doors and broader conflicts of interest issues.
Together Avril and Korkea-aho are presently conducting a study on the revolving
doors in the context of competition law and policy in the European Commission.
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